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Uniswap V3 Multicall Phishing Challenge

Learn to identify and avoid Multicall signature phishing

Educational Purpose Only

Attackers are now exploiting legitimate Uniswap V3 Multicall contracts to steal tokens from unsuspecting users. This challenge will teach you how to identify and protect yourself from these sophisticated phishing attacks.

In this simulation, you'll experience how scammers trick users into signing malicious permit authorizations that appear to come from legitimate Uniswap contracts.

Your Wallet

Address: 0x1234ab7890123456781232345678901234567890

Total Balance

$15,245.67

Your Tokens

ETH
Ethereum (WETH)
2.5 ETH
Lido ETH
Lido Staked ETH (stETH)
85 stETH
UNI
Uniswap (UNI)
500 UNI

Swap Tokens

Signature Request

Method: Permit

Owner: 0x1234ab7890123456781232345678901234567890

Spender: 0x68b3465833fb72A70ecDF485E0e4C7bD8665Fc45 (Uniswap V3: Multicall)

Value: 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935

Nonce: 5

Token: Lido Staked ETH (stETH)

Deadline: 2025-04-21

Transaction Details

Transaction Hash: 0x7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b

From: Hacker

To: 0x5BA1e12693Dc8F9c48aAD8770482f4739bEeD696 (Uniswap V3: Multicall)

Function: aggregate

Call Data: 0x252dba42000000000000000000000000...

Included Operations:

  • permit(address owner, address spender, uint256 value, uint256 deadline, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
  • transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value)

Note: This transaction uses a previously signed Permit signature to authorize the Multicall contract to transfer your tokens.

Phishing Attack Detected!

You just encountered a Uniswap V3 Multicall phishing attack. The signature request you received was malicious!

Here's what happened:

  • You were asked to sign a permit for a legitimate Uniswap V3 Multicall contract
  • The phisher used the Multicall's aggregate function to bundle multiple calls
  • This would allow them to execute both a permit and a transfer in a single transaction
  • Even though the contract address is legitimate, the transaction itself was malicious

Important Security Note: This method has been used by Drainers to bypass wallet security mechanisms. By bundling multiple operations into a single transaction through Multicall, attackers can obscure the true intent of the transaction, making it difficult for wallet security features to detect the malicious activity.

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